Product Description
The bills of rights adopted in the Commonwealth countries of Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and, at the subnational level, Australia in recent decades, have prompted scholars and institutional actors involved in the process of constitutional design and reform to rethink how to evaluate and compare the different approaches to human rights protection. They have challenged a number of assumptions in the field, for example, that courts must have the power to invalidate laws that are found to violate rights (ie courts can now be given non-binding powers), that courts must have the ‘final word’ on rights issues (ie legislatures can now be given the power to override judicial decisions) and that bills of rights are enforced exclusively by courts (ie legislators can now be given new responsibilities to ensure that the laws they enact are compatible with rights).
This book addresses three questions arising from these developments. How do these new bills of rights differ from the traditional approaches to rights protection? Why, if at all, should we consider the Commonwealth’s approach over the traditional approaches? What compromises must be struck in the course of adopting a bill of rights of this variety? In answering these questions, the book sets out a new framework for comparison that focuses on the types of inter-institutional disagreement facilitated by and found in the different approaches to rights protection. It also identifies a previously unrecognised element of the Commonwealth’s approach – the normative trade-offs with other constitutional principles and values – that is pivotal to understanding its operation. Finally, it seeks to contribute to future debates about rights reform in Australia and elsewhere by setting out a number of lessons that emerge from the answers to these three questions.
**Dr Scott Stephenson, From Dialogue to Disagreement in Comparative Rights Constitutionalism, was joint winner of the inaugural Holt Prize 2015.
Foreword by The Hon Chief Justice Robert S French AC
Acknowledgments
About the Author
Table of Cases
Table of Statutes
1. Introduction
I. Three questions
II. The Commonwealth’s approach
III. How is multi-stage rights review different?
IV. Why multi-stage rights review?
V. Which normative trade-offs must be made?
VI. Structure of the book
2. The advent of multi-stage rights review
I. Introduction
II. Canada
A. Prelude to the Charter: the Bill of Rights 1960
B. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982
III. New Zealand
IV. The United Kingdom
V. Australia
VI. Conclusion
3. Framework for comparison
I. Introduction
II. Expounding the framework for comparison
A. Focusing on inter-institutional interaction
B. Focusing on inter-institutional disagreement
C. Why institutions?
D. Why disagreement?
III. Other frameworks of comparison
A. Incorporating all three institutions of government
B. Incorporating the nuances of the traditional paradigms
C. Emphasising the compromises associated with multi-stage rights review
D. The case for a framework based on inter-institutional disagreement
IV. Conclusion
4. Legislative supremacy
I. Introduction
II. Opportunities for, and costs of, indirect inter-institutional disagreement
III. Types of indirect inter-institutional disagreement
A. Judicial review of administrative action
B. Statutory interpretation
C. Structural constitutional provisions
IV. Conclusion
5. Judicial supremacy
I. Introduction
II. Direct inter-institutional disagreement
III. Opportunities for, and costs of, indirect inter-institutional disagreement
IV. Expounding indirect inter-institutional disagreement
A. Why the United States?
B. Types of indirect inter-institutional disagreement
C. Legitimacy
V. Conclusion
6. Multi-stage rights review
I. Introduction
II. Direct inter-institutional disagreement
A. Stage one: executive review
B. Stage two: legislative committee review
C. Stage three: judicial review
D. Stage four: legislative override
E. The cumulative effects of multi-stage rights review
F. A culture of justification
G. Deference
H. Not necessarily weak or intermediate
III. The case for direct inter-institutional disagreement
A. Multiple perspectives and multiple points of public participation
B. Analogous ideas associated with the traditional paradigms
C. Beyond disagreement?
IV. Conclusion
7. Normative trade-offs
I. Introduction
II. Bureaucratic independence
III. Responsible government
IV. Separation of powers
V. The rule of law
VI. The hierarchy of laws
VII. Comity
VIII. Bicameralism
IX. An additional set of factors to help explain practice
X. Conclusion
8. The United Kingdom
I. Introduction
II. Executive review
A. Practice
B. Analysis
III. Legislative committee review
A. Practice
B. Analysis
IV. Judicial review
A. Practice
B. Analysis
V. Legislative override
A. Practice
B. Analysis
9. Canada
I. Introduction
II. Executive review and legislative review
A. Practice
B. Analysis
III. Judicial review
A. Practice
B. Analysis
IV. Legislative override
A. Practice
B. Analysis
10. New Zealand
I. Introduction
II. Executive review and legislative review
A. Practice
B. Analysis
III. Judicial review
A. Practice
B. Analysis
IV. Legislative override
A. Practice
B. Analysis
11. Australia
I. Introduction
II. Executive review and legislative committee review
A. Practice
B. Analysis
III. Judicial review and legislative override
A. Practice
B. Analysis
12. Conclusion
I. The importance and relevant point of context
II. Responsible government and bicameralism
III. The rule of law
IV. The separation of powers
V. Other normative trade-offs
VI. The limits of direct disagreement
VII. The next step
Bibliography
Index